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Abstract 
We propose, develop, and analyze a mathematical model of intergroup attitudes in a community that is divided 
between two distinct social groups (which may be distinguished by religion, ethnicity, or some other socially 
distinguishing factor). The model is based on very simple premises that are both intuitive and justified by 
sociological research. We investigate the behavior of the model in various special cases, for various model 
configurations. We discuss the stability of the model, and the continuous or discontinuous dependence of model 
behavior on various parameters. Finally, we discuss possible implications for strategies to improve intergroup 
affinity, and to defuse tension and prevent deterioration of  intergroup relationships. 
1 Purpose and Scope 
Many local communities, especially in the Third World, are markedly divided between two or more very distinct 
ethnic or religious groups. In sub-Saharan Africa for instance, many villages, towns, and cities comprise distinct 
groups of "Christian" and "Muslim" residents. In some cases, residential neighborhoods are completely 
integrated; in others, districts or quarters belong to one or the other religion. These situations may or may not be 
accompanied by interreligious tensions (Rasmussen, 1993; Mehler, 2005, 127).  In other situations, towns may 
be divided between two dominant ethnicities, such as Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi and Rwanda (Dominus, 2014).  
In Kenya, many local and regional conflicts have pitted two resident tribes against each other (Kimenyi, 2005, 
126).  
Divided communities are not unique to Africa.  Following the Bosnian war, cities in Bosnia had physical 
boundaries that divided different ethnicities (Bosnian Serbs, Bosniacs, and Bosnian Croats), ensuring that the 
different ethnic groups did not mix in daily life or work.  Over time, some grassroots efforts have been initiated 
to increase contacts between the two groups (Demichelis, 1998, 3). “Peace walls” have separated Catholic and 
Protestant neighborhoods in Northern Ireland for more than forty years: residents generally acknowledge that 
these walls have helped to preserve safety and security, but have also negatively impacted quality of life (Byrne 
et al., 2012). 
On many occasions, horrific violence has resulted when relations between co-resident groups has degenerated. 
Even when outright violence is avoided, hostility, mistrust, and avoidance between neighboring factions have 
considerable economic and social costs, which serve as strong motivations for improved relations. A better 
understanding of the dynamics of affinity/hostility between groups may be invaluable in fostering amicable 
relationships.  
This paper proposes and analyzes a heuristic mathematical model of intergroup relations within a community 
consisting of two distinct groups clearly identified by religion or ethnicity. Mathematical modeling is an 
increasingly important tool in shaping social policy. Although mathematical models have significant limitations 
and are prone to oversimplification, nonetheless they can provide valuable assistance in understanding, 
predicting, preventing, and resolving adverse social conditions.  We shall use our model to address the following 
questions: 
 What type of evolution can be expected for different model conditions (which are exemplified by 
different model parameter values)? 
 What stable distributions of affinity/hostility are possible for different model conditions? 
 Do stable distributions vary continuously with changes in conditions, or are there cases where small 
changes in conditions produce large differences in the distribution of affinities/animosities? 
 What strategies that target model conditions are sufficient to bring about desired changes in intergroup 
attitudes? 
 What model conditions may produce deterioration in intergroup attitudes? 
Our model is based on a small number of intuitive principles, and contains only a few parameters. The values of 
these parameters may not be measurable in a practical situation: but even without knowing the parameters’ 
values, the model can be used to predict qualitative behavior of a split community. This information may be 
potentially useful in devising strategies to reconcile groups and promote stability. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we survey the current literature on 
mathematical models of intergroup violence. In Section 3 we discuss examples of programs designed to mitigate 
tensions between divided communities. In Section 4 we present the heuristic justification of the model, and its 
mathematical specification. In Section 5 we provide mathematical analyses of the model under various particular 
conditions. In Section 6 we present several characteristic simulations and their implications for model behavior.  
In Section 7 we summarize our findings and draw conclusions. Section 8 lists references. 
2 Survey of mathematical models of intergroup conflict 
2.1 Statistical studies 
Several authors have produced empirical statistical analyses of violence on a national scale. Some representative 
examples are as follows: 
 Elbsdawi and Sambanis (2000) consider the question of why there are so many civil wars in Africa.  
They perform an empirical statistical analysis on the likelihood of civil war in African nations, as well as 
nations in other continents. It is suggested that Africa is more likely to have civil wars not because of 
ethnic and religious variations, but because of the lack of solid government and economics.  Factors such 
as poverty level, economics predominantly based on natural resources, and low education levels are 
cited as contributing factors to likelihood of civil wars.  They claim that to create a stable environment, 
Africa needs to use its diversity (through cooperative programs) as an asset, and needs democratic 
political reform paired with more economic programs that are not solely based on natural resources.  
 Collier and Hoeffler (2002) use an empirical/analytical model to show that Africa's civil wars can be 
predicted based on economic performance.  They hypothesize that all governments have citizens who are 
unsatisfied and willing to resort to violence. The probability that this will happen depends on the rebels’ 
ability to financially raise an army of equal size to the government’s military force. The more financially 
stable a country is, the more sizable a country’s defense, and the less likely a rebel force can financially 
support a military rebellion. Also related to economic stability, Collier and Hoeffler found that the lower 
per capita income and higher population rate increases the risk of conflict. 
2.2 Agent-based models 
Alternatively, some researchers use agent-based models in an attempt to understand civil violence. Some 
representative examples are given as follows: 
 Schelling (1969) presents an agent-based model which does not address violence per se, but rather the 
evolution of communities that consist of two coexisting groups with separate ethnic identities. The 
model’s structure is very simple: The community is modeled as a checkerboard, and the residences 
belonging to the different ethnicities (which are the “agents” in the model) are represented by markers of 
two different colors. The markers move according to rules designed to reflect individuals’ relative 
preference to live next to others like themselves. Schelling demonstrates that under these conditions, 
segregated communities are self-forming: integrated communities will decompose into segregated 
regions.  The severity of segregation depends on the parameters set for each group of agents.  The higher 
the demand of a group to be around others like themselves, the more segregated and tightly clustered the 
neighborhood will become.  If one group has a higher tolerance for neighbors unlike themselves, then 
the community will have the more tolerant group spread widely with small clusters of the more 
intolerant group packed tightly into areas of the community. These eventual results are relatively 
independent of initial conditions, but do depend on system parameters. Although Schelling’s model 
initially received little attention, it gained considerable prominence in the U.S. during the debate over 
residential segregation in the 1980s and 1990s (Clark and Fossett, 2006). 
 Epstein (2002) created a model of the spread of social violence which similarly uses agents on a 
checkerboard.  The model employs population agents of three types—actively violent, inactive, or 
jailed—as well as “cop” agents that are able to “arrest” nearby active agents.  The likelihood of an agent 
becoming actively violent depends on that agents’ sense of grievance, as well as the risk of being 
arrested (which depends on the presence of “cops” in the vicinity). Epstein shows that under certain 
conditions localized bursts of violence can occur. He suggests that the model may give insight into the 
dynamics behind outbursts of interethnic violence, and that this insight could provide valuable insight 
into the development of policies to prevent and contain violence.  
 Salerno et al. (2011, 2013) developed the National Operational Environment Model (NOEM), which 
includes an agent-based model of population behavior on a national scale. NOEM is intended to supply 
decision makers with information about possible social responses (including civil violence) to military 
operations that affect infrastructure and other physical conditions.  The population response model is 
fundamentally based on Epstein’s model.  
 Thron et al. (2012) show that an agent-based model can duplicate the statistical characteristics exhibited 
by service protests in the Gauteng Providence in South Africa from 2004-2010. Starting with a 
simplified version of the NOEM as basis, adjustments are made to include media influence, which 
accounts for the fact that violence does not always spread in a geographically continuous manner. 
 Thron and Jackson (2013) consider the general application of Epstein-style agent-based models of social 
violence to practical situations. They argue that the model does not accurately reflect spatial mechanisms 
that lead to the formation of social violence, and that the model is simply displaying generic features 
common to systems that exhibit self-organized criticality. They conclude that the model is better suited 
as a phenomenological description rather than a dynamical explanation of social violence capable of 
prediction.  
 Nizamani et.al (2014) models the relationship between public outrage and public violence.  Using five 
types of agents (sensitive, upset, violent, relaxed, and immune), a model is constructed based on a 
system of differential equations.  Nizamani applies this model to analyze the effects that an event has on 
populations in other parts of the world (for example a movie made in one country that causes public 
outrage in another). In this model, all agents start out as “sensitive” with only a few having knowledge 
of the event.  The agents with knowledge will be randomly designated as either “immune” or “upset”.  
Public outrage then spreads by a mathematical mechanism which models word-of-mouth propagation.  
The model produces a pattern of outrage that can turn to violence, but always ends with either all 
“immune” or “relaxed” agents.  The severity of the outrage depends on the parameters used for the 
agents.   
2.3 Other mathematical models 
There is also literature on mathematical models of coalitions and strategies in situations of inter-group violence:  
 Zachary (1977) develops an information flow model, which he applies to the case study of a karate club 
that experience conflict which eventually resulted in the club’s breaking apart. Using information about 
members’ opinions and interactions with each other outside of the club meetings, Zachary was able to 
explain most members’ choice of affiliation following the breakup.  
 The text of Jones (2000) describes game theory models and strategies for conflict.  She models 
cooperative games, non-cooperative games, zero sum games, matrix games, and bargaining games.   
 Azam (2001) investigates the role of government in redistribution of resources as a strategy for 
mitigating conflict. Azam builds a theoretical model that analyzes the chance of rebellion due to 
different government actions.  His model shows that appropriate redistribution of resources and aid may 
discourage rebellion; while inequitable distribution of aid can actually incite rebellion. An important 
conclusion is that ethnic identity should not be stamped out, but used to help build up a country.  
 Pawlak (2004) develops a mathematical representation of intergroup conflict, using the current conflict 
in the Middle East as an example.  Countries in the Middle East are modeled are represented as nodes on 
a graph. For each issue, each edge of the graph is assigned a value between -1 and 1, where value of -
1(1) reflects complete disagreement (agreement) between the two agent-nodes joined by the given edge. 
Based on this information, Pawlak defines functions that characterize degree of conflict, which Pawlak 
argues can be used as an aid to decision-making and in the mathematical modeling of conflicts. 
 Fraenkel and Grofman (2004) use a mathematical model to evaluate the effectiveness of Horowitz's 
alternative voting scheme (Horowitz, 2003) in producing moderate politics in electorates that are deeply 
divided along ethnic or religious lines.  The alternative voting scheme attempts to give an advantage to 
parties that can attract votes across the divide.  They supplement their analysis with an examination of 
the 1999 elections in Fiji, and conclude that practical results vary greatly from Horowitz’s prediction.   
 Osborne (2010) hypothesizes that conflict between ethnic groups occurs when it is economically more 
profitable. He considers an asymmetrical case of two ethnic groups where one group (the majority) has 
all the power to control taxation of resource production, while the other group (the minority) can choose 
to either to share resources and submit to taxation or move towards separatism and share resources 
internally. The minority group’s choice is not all or nothing, but rather partial sharing of resources is also 
allowed by the model. The model predicts that the amount of resources shared by the minority varies 
inversely with the amount of taxation. Osborne also performs an empirical analysis of intergroup 
conflict, taking into account factors such as distribution of the population, ordinal ranking according to 
the World Bank’s ease of doing business scale, and percent of the country’s GDP that consists of food. 
He gives tables showing which variables were significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  These empirical 
findings confirm his hypothesis that ethnic conflict should increase when incentive for economic 
cooperation decreases.  He cites economic freedom as an important component of peaceful interethnic 
relations. 
3 Strategies for mitigating tensions in divided communities:   
One strategy that has been used to reduce tensions in divided communities is to encourage positive contact 
between groups through sports. Some examples are as follows:  
 The NGO Mercy Corps used this strategy in Sri Lanka to address the hostility and mistrust between 
Tamils, Sinhalese, and Muslims following an extended, ethnically-based civil war. In 2011 over a period 
of 12 months, Mercy Corps conducted workshops for youth leaders and coaches, and organized multi-
ethnic sporting events. The program involved two thousand youth from twelve villages, and Mercy 
Corps reported a 20% increase in positive relations across groups (“Peace and reconciliation,” 2011). 
 The Football 4 Peace program, initiated by the University of Brighton’s School of Sport and Service 
Management, trains coaches to instill cooperation and provides opportunities for children from different 
groups to play on the same team. The original program was in Israel, involving Jewish and Arab 
children; subsequent programs have been conducted in Jordan and Ireland/Northern Ireland (“Football 4 
Peace”, n.d.). 
 Right to Play International, headquartered in Canada, is active in about 20 countries around the world 
and aims at teaching cooperation and acceptance to children in violence-prone communities through 
games and providing an alternative outlet to guns and violence (“Right to Play”, n.d.). 
Similar examples include the Open Fun Football Schools (involving 22 countries in Eastern Europe and central 
Asia) (“Open Fun”, n.d.), and a number of sports-based initiatives in post-apartheid South Africa. An analysis of 
these South African initiatives by Höglund and Sundberg leads the authors to conclude that poorly-organized 
programs can actually enhance conflict between groups, but well-run initiatives can serve both as a bridge 
between divided communities and as an outlet for entertainment to keep violent behavior from developing 
(Höglund and Sundberg, 2008). An analysis of several reconciliation-through-sports initiatives by Selliaas, leads 
him to the following conclusions (Selliaas, 2007):   
 It is hard to draw firm conclusions concerning the effectiveness of these programs, as they are relatively 
new;  
 All of these programs are started after some measure of stability has been achieved;  
 NGO’s play an important role in the implementation of these programs; 
 Sports do not start reconciliation, but can play a role in a bigger reconciliation project. 
4 Mathematical model specifications 
Our mathematical model is based on common-sense observations about human interactions that are also 
supported by sociological research. We first state these principles as heuristic “rules of thumb”, and then provide 
corresponding mathematical translations. 
4.1 Heuristic formulation of model  
The following “rules of thumb” are assumed to govern interpersonal interactions in a community consisting of 
two strongly distinct social groups. 
H1) Individuals within each group have varying degrees of affinity towards the other group, which can be 
ranked on a linear scale. On the one end are the extremists, who despise and avoid the other group and 
are prone to inciting violence. On the other end are the moderates, who treat individuals from the other 
group on an almost equal basis.  
H2) Constructive (cooperative) interactions between individuals in different groups tend to improve their 
affinities for each other, due to the mutual benefit derived from the interaction.  Such contacts may occur 
through daily commerce, education, community development, sports, and so on. This assumption is 
empirically supported by the outcomes of the sports programs described in Section 3.   
H3) Isolation and lack of contact between groups tend to increase hostility: separatism leads to rumor-
mongering, mistrust, and misunderstanding (Bourhis, 2009, 46). On the other hand, more contact leads to 
more accommodation. For example, in the Zanzibar region of Tanzania, ninety eight percent of the 
population is Muslim: but as tourism and Western influence has increased, strict rules for behavior during 
Ramadan become more relaxed and behaviors are not strictly enforced (Lodhi, 1994, 92). 
H4) Extremists in either group will tend to avoid and discourage interactions with the other group. (Hardin, 
2002) 
H5) In interpersonal interactions, individuals tend to influence other individuals towards their own opinion. 
(Vallacher & Nowak, 2005)  
4.2 Mathematical formulation: 
The heuristic assumptions (H1)–(H5) have been translated into mathematical specifications as follows: 
M1) The community consists of two groups of equal size, each group modeled as a set of N agents. 
M2) Each individual in each group has an affinity towards the other group. Any individual's affinity is a 
number between 0 (extreme hostility) and 1 (the other group is treated on equal basis with the 
individual’s own group). At the beginning, each individual's affinity is chosen randomly between 0 and 1.  
We will denote the affinity of agent A as a(A). This specification reflects the heuristic assumption (H1). 
M3) Over the course of the simulation, individuals interact with each other, and their affinities change as a 
result of the interaction. For simplicity, we assume that individual interactions involve just two agents, 
and that interactions occur sequentially one after the other. Each interaction is modeled as follows: 
a. Choose a random agent A1 who participates in the interaction. 
b. Choose a second agent A2 as follows.  With probability 1 – a(A1)/2, the second agent is in the 
same group as A1.  Otherwise, the second agent is chosen randomly from the other group.  (This 
rule reflects assumption (H4), since it implies that the frequency of interaction with the other 
group is positively correlated with affinity.) Note that  a(A1)=1 implies the second agent is 
chosen from either group with equal probability, while a(A1)=0 means that the second agent is 
always chosen from the individual’s same group. 
c. Change the two agents' affinities based on the interaction, as follows.  
If the two agents are in the same group, then:  
a(A1)  a(A1) – b1 + ch(a(A2) – a(A1)) + 1;    
a(A2)  a(A2) – b1 – ch(a(A2) – a(A1)) + 2. 
If the two agents are in different groups, then:  
a(A1)  a(A1) + b2 + ch(a(A2) – a(A1)) + 1;     
a(A2)  a(A2) + b2 – ch(a(A2) – a(A1)) + 2. 
In these equations, 
b1 denotes the (negative) drift in affinity due to a single same-group interaction. 
b2 denotes the (positive) drift in affinity due to a single inter-group interaction. 
c  denotes the strength of “cohesion”, that is the tendency of two interacting agents to influence 
each other towards their own opinion. 
h  is a function (which we shall refer to as the “influence function”) that expresses the effect of 
the affinity difference between two individuals on the affinity adjustment resulting from 
interaction between those individuals. We will consider two possibilities for the influence 
function:  step function (h(x) = sign(x)) and linear (h(x) = x).  
   is a noise variance. 
 1, 2 are independent, identically distributed normal random variables with mean 0 and 
variance 1.   
Since affinities are limited to lie in the range [0,1]; the values of a generated by the above two equations 
are clipped to lie in this range:  a  max(0, min(1,a)). 
The affinity change equations in M3) part (c) reflect heuristic assumptions (H2), (H3) and (H5):  The b1  
(resp. b2) terms reflect assumption  (H2) (resp. (H3)) that within-group (resp. between-group) interactions 
tend to degrade (resp. improve) affinity towards the other group. The c terms reflect (H5)’s assertion that 
interactions between individuals tend to bring those individuals’ opinions closer together. 
5 Theoretical Analysis of Model Behavior 
5.1 Overview 
We may gain considerable insight into the model behavior by considering various special cases. These special 
cases also have practical significance, which we will elucidate in each case. 
In all of these special cases, we are interested in changes in composition over time of each group. In particular, 
we consider how the percentages of extremists and moderates changes over time; and we investigate how 
conditions (represented by model parameters) may be changed to tilt the balance towards increased or reduced 
affinity. 
The special cases that we will consider are as follows: 
Case 1. All individuals in each group begin with the same affinity (although the two groups’ affinities may 
differ). In this case, we are particularly interested in the eventual steady-state affinities of the groups, 
depending on the initial affinities. 
Case 2. Both groups are initially divided into extremist (affinity = 0) and moderate (affinity=1) factions. In this 
case, we are interested in the stability of configurations consisting of given proportions of extremist and 
moderate factions. 
Case 3. Both groups start out with uniform affinity distributions on [0,1]. As in the previous case, we are 
interested in the eventual steady-state affinities. 
In this section, we will provide approximate mathematical analyses for Case 1 and Case 2. These theoretical 
analyses are supplemented by the simulations presented in Section 6.  In addition to these special cases, we shall 
derive a differential equation for the evolution of the affinity probability densities using a continuous 
approximation. It turns out this approximate equation can be solved exactly when the expected values of the 
distributions are constant. This equation gives insight into the dispersive properties of the probability 
distributions as a function of model parameters (especially the parameter c). 
5.2 Case 1: Unanimous starting affinities for each group. 
In order to gain some theoretical insight into the situation where starting affinities are unanimous for each group, 
we make some simplifying assumptions that enable us to compute an exact solution. Simulations performed in 
Section 6 will confirm that these assumptions are indeed approximately satisfied. 
5.2.1 “Sticky model” approximation and equation 
We denote by “sticky model” the case where each group’s agents all have the same affinity for all time. This is 
never strictly accurate, but in some cases it is approximately true, and it does have the advantage that it enables 
an exact solution.  Furthermore, we shall find that it give accurate indications of the evolution of distribution 
medians, even when within-group affinities do in fact diverge 
The “sticky model” case may be formally specified by the following condition: 
Sticky condition:  If all agents in a particular group start out with the same affinity, then they will maintain nearly 
the same affinity. In other words, once the distribution of affinities for a particular group has coalesced to a 
single value, all the affinities move together. 
The sticky condition will never be exactly true for our model: nonetheless, we may perform an idealized 
mathematical analysis assuming that the sticky condition is true. In this case, then the affinity of each individual 
in either group is equal to the mean affinity of the group to which that individual belongs. 
Let x1 and x2 be the mean affinities for the two different groups. Then in the case where =0, we may calculate 
the changes in x1 and x2 due to a single interaction as follows: 
I. The probability that the agent A1 is in Group 1 is ½. If this happens, there are two cases: 
a. The probability that the second agent A2 is in Group 1 is (1– x1/2). In this case, x1 will decrease 
due to the interaction by an amount 2b1/N, where N is the total number of agents in Group 1 
(which is equal to the number of agents in Group 2). 
b. The probability that the second agent A2 is in Group 2 is x1/2. In this case, x1 will change by an 
amount  (b2+ch(x2 – x1))/N.  Also, x2 will change by an amount (b2–ch(x2 – x1))/N. 
II. The probability that the agent A1 is in Group 2 is ½. If this happens, there are two cases: 
a. The probability that the second agent A2 is in Group 2 is (1– x2/2). In this case, x2 will decrease 
due to the interaction by an amount 2b1/N. 
b. The probability that the second agent A2 is in Group 1 is x2/2. In this case, x2 will change by an 
amount  (b2–c h(x2 – x1))/N.  Also, x1 will change by an amount  (b2+ch(x2 – x1))/N. 
We may summarize this information in the following equations for the mean affinitiesafter a single interaction 
(denoted by x1and x2, for the case where =0: 
 x1=x1+(1/2N)(1 – x1/2)(–2b1)+ x1/2(b2+ ch(x2–x1))}+(1/2N)(x2/2)(b2 + ch(x2–x1)), 
   x2=x2+(1/2N)(1 – x2/2)(–2b1)+x2/2(b2 – ch(x2–x1))}+(1/2N)(x1/2)(b2 – ch(x2–x1)). 
When 0, a random noise term with variance  must be added to each of these equations.  
In the following, we will solve this model exactly for two different functional forms of the influence function h. 
The two solutions point out different interesting mathematical aspects of the model, and also show the 
robustness of model behavior to changes in the functional form of h.  
5.2.1.1 Piecewise-linear version of sticky model: exact solution 
If we take h(x2–x1) = sign(x2–x1), then the above equations for x1and x2may be simplified to: 
 x1=x1 – (b1/N) + (b1/N) 1/2 + 1/4(b2+ sc)/b1}x1+ { (1 /4)(b2 + sc) /b1 }x2 ], 
   x2=x2 – (b1/N) + (b1/N)(1/4)(b2 – sc) /b1} x1 + 1/2 + 1/4(b2 – sc) /b1}x2 ], 
where s sign(x2 – x1). These equations may be rewritten in matrix-vector form as 
 x = x + (0.25b1/N){ ( 2I + b2/b1 F + sc/b1G )x – f }, 
where (using Matlab/Octave/Scilab notation for matrices, in which matrix rows are separated by semicolons) 
  x = [ x1 ;  x2];  F = [1, 1; 1, 1];   G = [ 1, 1; -1, -1];  f =  [4; 4].  
For simplicity we define 
  b2/b1;     c/b1;      0.25b1/N;  A    2I + F + sG.   
Then the equation for x can be written 
 x = x + (Ax – f), 
which is a linear equation. (Note however that different linear equations apply in the two regimes x2 >x1 and x2 
<x1, because the value of s differs.) If we let k denote the solution of 
       Ak =  f, 
then defining z  x – k we have 
 z = (I + A)z,   
The solution for k is: 
 k = 2(1+)-1[1 – s ; 1 + s]. 
The vector k  will take two values (which we denote as k+, k–) in the two regions x1< x2 and x1> x2. The two 
values k+, k– are symmetrical with respect to the line x1= x2: they are also symmetrical with respect to the point 
(1+)-1[ 2 ;  2 ]. In the case where b2/ b1 = = 3, this is the point [1/2; 1/2]. 
Within each region, this gives the solution for x(m) (the value of x after m interactions) as 
 x(m) =  ( I + A )m(x0 – ks) + ks, 
where x0 = (x10 ; x20) denotes the vector of initial affinities of the system.   
The eigenvectors of A are the eigenvectors of F + sG, which are [1; 1] and [1 + s; 1 – s].  The 
corresponding eigenvalues are 2 and 2(1+ ). When   0.25b1/N  is small (which we would expect for large 
populations N), we have the approximation: 
 x(m)   etA (x0 – ks) + ks,  where  t m. 
It follows that in this case the matrix A and the vectors ks (s=1) uniquely determine the shape of the system 
trajectories, including the ultimate fate of the system.  The factor  only influences how fast the system moves 
along each trajectory, but not the trajectory’s shape. Note that A and ks depend only on  and : so the two 
parameter  and  effectively determine the fate of the system. 
In order to generate these trajectories, we may write: 
   x0 – ks = q1v1 + q2v2, 
where v1 and v2 are the eigenvectors [1; 1] and [1 + s; 1 – s], and q1 and  q2 are constants to be solved for.  
Recalling that the eigenvalues are 2 and 2(1+ ) respectively, we have 
   x(m)   e2t q1v1   + e
2(1+)t q2v2 + ks. 
From this formula, several properties of the trajectories may be derived. Since both eigenvalues are positive, it 
follows that the fixed points  k+, k– are both repellors in their respective regions. This means that trajectories will 
consistently move away from the location of ks.  If   min(1, (1)/2 ), then ks is located outside of the square 
[0,1]2, and all trajectories will move towards the line x1=x2 which separates the two regions. On the other hand, if 
  min(1, (1)/2 ) then only some trajectories will move towards the line x1= x2, and others will move away. 
The trajectories all eventually tend to align with the direction of the second eigenvector v2 = [1 + s; 1 – s], 
since the second eigenvalue has the largest magnitude.  
5.2.1.2 Nonlinear version of the sticky model 
We have noted that when the influence function h(x2–x1) = sign(x2–x1) then the sticky model is linear in each 
region {x1< x2}, {x1> x2}. A nonlinear version of the model is obtained when we use instead the influence 
function: h(x2–x1)= x2–x1. In this case, the evolution equations simplify to (using the previous definitions of , , 
) 
 x1=x1 +  2x1 + (x1+x2) + (x2
2
 –x1
2) – 4], 
   x2=x2 + 2x2 + (x1+x2) + (x1
2
 –x2
2) – 4]. 
Adding these two equations, we have (letting  X = x1 + x2) 
 X=X{1 + 2(1+)} – 8. 
Define  
 (1+);   k2/=2/(1+)=2b1/(b1+ b2);     ZX–2k, 
then we have 
 Z=(1+2)Z, 
which implies (when 2<1) 
 X(m) = (1+2)m(x10 + x20 – 2k) + 2k, e
2mZ0 + 2k, 
where Z0  x10 + x20 – 2k. 
If instead of adding we subtract the two equations, we find (Y x2 – x1): 
 Y – Y = 2 – X)Y, 
which implies 
 ln Y – ln Y  2 – X). 
or 
 ln Ym – ln Y0  2j=0,…,m-1  – X
(j) ). 
By substituting our previous solution for X(j), after some algebra we find 
 Ym  Y0 exp[ 2m1–2k) –  z0e
2m–1) ]. 
Defining  
   1–2k) = 0.25b1/N (1– 4c/(b1+ b2)) 
and  
   Z0( x10 + x20 – 2k)c / (b1+ b2),
we obtain finally: 
 X(m)  e2 mZ0 + 2k, 
 Ym  (Y0 e
2m)exp( –e2m – 1] ). 
From the definitions of X and Y we have  
 (X+Y)/2 = x2 ;   (X–Y)/2 = x1,  
and we may derive a vector form of the dynamical equation: 
 x(m) = e
21–2k) mexp( –e(1+)m – 1] ) q1[1 ; –1] + e
2(1+) m q2[1 ; 1]  + k [1 ; 1], 
where the constants q1 and q2 are solved from initial conditions. It is instructive to compare this result with the 
piecewise-linear model: 
 x(m)   e2m q1[1; –1]   + e
2(1+)m q2[1 + s; 1 – s]  + k[1 – s ; 1 + s]. 
From comparing the two expressions, we find that they agree when =0 as expected. 
5.2.1.3 Effectiveness of “sports program” in sticky model 
In Section 3 we described several sports programs that are intended to foster positive intergroup  relations in 
divided communities.  Let us consider the potential effectiveness of such programs under the sticky assumption, 
so that each group maintains unanimous affinities. In this case, we have shown that the value of k2b1(b1+ b2)
-1  
is critical in determining the eventual affinities of both groups. Sports programs aim to create opportunities for 
positive interactions between groups: as such, they are targeted towards increasing b2 for a subset of each group.  
Suppose that due to a single sporting event the mean value of b2 for a proportion  p of each group’s population is 
increased by a factor r.  In this case, the average b2 changes by: b2b2{1+(r1)p}. Then given that (r1)p <<1, 
we have  
 k 2(1+ b2/b1)
-1  2 (1+ {1 + (r1)p}b2/b1)
-1   k {1 – (r1)p[b2/(b1+ b2)] }. 
It follows that the proportionate change in k is {(r1)pb2/(b1+ b2)}, which is smaller than the mean percentage 
change in b2 by a factor of b2/(b1+ b2).  Thus if the within-group negative drift b1 is large compared to the 
positive inter-group drift b2, then the positive effect of the sports program is seriously eroded.  This seems to 
imply that sports programs will be ineffective when strong negative within-group drifts exist. We will confirm 
this tentative conclusion with simulations in Section 6. 
5.3 Case 2: polarized starting distributions 
Rather than starting with unanimous groups as in Case 1, we may also consider the case where each group 
begins with extremist and moderate factions (with affinities 0 and 1, respectively). In the following, we consider 
the question of when such polarized-group distributions can remain stable. 
It turns out that in this situation it is easier to work with the nonlinear model. We may follow the derivation of 
the dynamical equations for the sticky model, except instead of having two groups we have four: Groups 1a, 2a, 
1b, 2b, which consist of extremists in Groups 1 and 2, and moderates in Groups 1 and 2, respectively. Groups 1a 
and 1b contain respectively fractions 1–f1 and f1 of the agents in Group 1, and Groups 2a and 2b similarly contain 
fractions 1–f2 and f2 of the agents in Group 2. Initially, we have characteristic affinities x1a, x2a  0 and x1b, x2b 1. 
With these four groups, using a procedure analogous to the derivation in the sticky model case, we obtain: 
   x1a  x1a  + (1/2N)( 1–f1) ( 1–f1) (–2b1)+ f1(–b1 + c) }+ (1/2N) f1( 1–f1) (–b1 + c)} 
                    + (1/2N) f2( 1–f1)(b2 + c)}; 
  x1b  x1b  + (1/2N) (1– f1) f1( –b1 – c)  + (1/2N) f1(1– f1)(–b1 – c) + f1( –2b1)  
         + (1/2)(1– f2)(b2–c) + (1/2)f2b2} + (1/2N) f2f1b2}, 
and similar equations with all ‘1’ indices exchanged with ‘2’. The condition that  x1a ≤ x1a leads to: 
         f2(b2 + c)    – f1(b1 + 3c) +4b1, 
while the condition that x1b  x1b leads to: 
    f2(b2+c)  –f1 (b1 + 3c) + 3b1–b2+ 4c.  
Using the same derivation with the two groups exchanged, we obtain two additional equations with f1 f2.  By 
comparing the two above inequalities, we obtain the following necessary conditions for stability: 
    c  (b2+b1) / 4. 
If c does not satisfy this condition, then all polarized groups are unstable. From the second inequality we also 
obtain the necessary condition  b2 b1: if this condition is not satisfied, both groups will end up unanimously 
extremist. 
5.4 Differential equation for evolution of probability densities 
So far we have only analyzed cases where the distributions of affinities assume only a handful of values at any 
given time. But in a system with N agents per group, it is actually possible for all N agents to have different 
affinities at any given time.  When N is large, it is reasonable to expect that the distributions will become nearly 
continuous, and the behavior may be approximated by a differential equation.  In the following we derive a 
differential equation for the evolution over time of the probability density, which can be solved exactly when the 
distributions’ expected values are known functions of time. To do this, we perform a differential analysis of how 
individual interactions will affect the overall distribution. 
Let p1(x1) and p2(x2) be the probability densities for the two groups, so that p1(x1)dx1= p2(x2) dx2 = 1 and 0≤ x1, 
x2 ≤ 1. From the above algorithm specification, we may find the differential transition probabilities into and out 
of the interval [x1, x1+dx1] during a single interaction between agents A1 and A2. 
(I)       The probability that the agent A1 is in Group 1 and has affinity in [x1, x1+dx1] is (1/2)p1(x1)dx1.  This 
will cause p1(x1)dx1 to decrease by (1/N).  
(II)       The probability that agent A1 and agent A2 are in Group 1 and have affinities u,v respectively such 
that agent u–b1+c(v–u)  [x1, x1+dx1] is   
     (1/2) dv p1([x1+ b1–vc](1–c)
-1)(1–[x1+ b1–vc](1–c)
-1/2) p1( v) (1–c)
-1dx1.  
  This will cause p1(x1)dx1 to increase by (1/N).  
(III) The probability that the agents A1 and A2 are both in Group 1, and A2 has affinity in [x1, x1+dx1] is  
    (1/2) dv p1(v)(1–v/2) p1( x) dx1.   
This will cause p1(x1)dx1 to decrease by (1/N).  
(IV) The probability that agent A1 and agent A2 are in Group 1 and have affinities u, v respectively such 
that v–b1+c(u–v)  [x1, x1+dx1] is   
     (1/2) du p1(u)(1–u/2) p1( [x1+ b1–uc](1–c)
-1 ) (1–c)-1 dx1.  
  This will cause p1(x1)dx1 to increase by (1/N). 
(V)        The probability that agent A1 is in Group 1 and agent A2 is in Group 2 with affinities u, v 
respectively such that u+b2+c(v–u)  [x1, x1+dx1] is   
     (1/2) dv p1([x1– b2–vc](1–c)
-1)( [x1– b2–vc](1–c)
-1/2 ) p2( v) (1–c)
-1 dx1.  
  This will cause p1(x1)dx1 to increase by (1/N). 
(VI) The probability that agent A1 is in Group 2 and agent A2 is in Group 1 with affinities u, v 
respectively such that v+b2+c(u–v)  [x1, x1+dx1] is   
     (1/2) du p2(u) (u/2) p1( [x1– b2–uc](1–c)
-1 ) (1–c)-1 dx1.  
  This will cause p1(x1)dx1 to increase by (1/N). 
(VII) The probability that agent A1 is in Group 2 and agent A2 is in Group 1 with affinities u, v 
respectively such that v  [x1, x1+dx1] is   
     (1/2) du p2(u) (u/2) p1(x1) dx1.  
  This will cause p1(x1)dx1 to decrease by (1/N). 
We also suppose that b1, b2, c <<1 so we may use derivative approximations, and we may neglect quadratic 
terms in these variables. Among other simplifications, this enables us to replace  (1–c)-1 with 1+c, So the 
contributions to  p1(x1) from the different terms are given by (2N)
-1 times the following factors:  
(I)   –p1(x1)  
(II)         p1(v){ p1( (1+c)x1+ b1– vc) (1 – [(1+c)x1+ b1– vc]/2)(1+c) }dv 
(III) – p1(v)(1–v/2) p1( x) dv  
(IV)   p1(v){ (1– v/2) p1( (1+c)x1+ b1– vc ) (1+c) }dv  
(V)          p2(v) { p1( (1+c)x1– b2– vc ) ( [(1+c)x1– b2– vc] /2) (1+c) } dv 
(VI)    p2(u) { (u/2) p1( (1+c)x1– b2– uc) (1+c) }du  
(VII) – p2(u) (u/2) p1(x1) du 
By integrating all of these terms over x1 (making use of change of variable), we may verify that the overall 
change in p1(x1)dx1 is 0, so that following the interaction the distribution still has total mass 1. 
Using Taylor expansion, we have (for c, k << 1) 
  f(x+cx+k)(1+c)  f(x)(1+c) + f (x)(cx+k)(1+c)  f(x) + cf(x) + (cx+k) f (x) 
or 
  f(x+cx+k)(1+c)   f(x) + [ (cx+k) f(x)], 
where the prime () denotes derivative with respect to x.  If we make this substitution in (I)–(VII), then all non-
derivative terms and cancel and we end up with the equation:   
  p1/t –  p1K1  = p1/x1 (K1x1 + K2),  
with: 
 K1 = 4c – b1  – b2 ; K2 = 4(b1– cE1) – b1E1 – b2E2 + c(V1 – V2), 
where Ei, and Vj (j = 1,2) are first and second moments respectively of the two groups: 
 E1 =  p1(v)v dv; E2 =  p2(v)v dv;  V1 = p1(v)v
2dv; V2 = p2(v) v
2dv. 
Notice that  Ej and Vj depend on t for j=1,2.  However, if we assume that Ej and Vj are approximately constant, 
then the equation may be rewritten as 
 /t (e–K1t p1) = /y (e
–K1t p1), 
where 
 y  = K1
-1log(K1x1+K2)+ C. 
The solution is then  (q is an arbitrary once-differentiable function) 
 p1 = e
K1t q(t+y) = eK1t q(t + K1
-1log(K1x1+K2)+ C). 
Defining  p10(w) = q( log(K1w)/K1), we find : 
  p1(x1,t) = e
K1t p10(e
K1t(x1 + K2/K1) ), 
and a similar equation holds for p2(x1,t) (with E1 E2 and V1 V2). Note that p10 is a probability density, and is 
in fact a shifted version of  p1(x1,0). 
  According to this solution, as the distribution of affinities evolves it maintains its basic initial shape, but 
becomes either stretched out or compressed over time, depending on whether K1>0 or K1<0, respectively.  It also 
undergoes translation which varies according to the changes in first and second moments.  
The above solution does not take into account the boundary conditions that prevent probability mass from 
escaping the interval [0,1], so it cannot accurately model systems in which probability mass moves to the 
boundaries. It does establish however that that no differentiable equilibrium solutions are possible when K1 0.  
It also indicates the possibility of a point-mass solution at x1 = K2/K1, which implies (from the p1 and p2 
equations, respectively) 
 (4c + b1  + b2)x1 = b1 (4–x1) – b2x2 + c(x1
2 – x2
2 – 4x1), 
 (4c + b1  + b2)x2 = b1 (4–x2) – b2x1 + c(x2
2 – x1
2 – 4x2). 
After algebraic manipulation we obtain: 
 x1 + x2 = 4b1 / (b1  + b2)    and  2(b1  + b2)(x2  x1)  =  8b1c(x2 – x1) / (b1  + b2), 
so that either  x2  x1 =0  or c = (b1  + b2)
2 / (4b1). We will investigate the existence of such fixed points in the 
next section. 
6 Simulations  
In the previous section we derived mathematical equations to describe system behavior, under various particular 
conditions and relying on simplifying assumptions. In this section, we report on computer simulations which 
were conducted to ascertain the accuracy of these equations, and to further explore the general behavior of the 
model. 
6.1 Unanimous-group starting conditions (Case 1) 
In order to verify the accuracy of the “sticky assumption”, we tracked the behavior of simulations where all 
individuals in Group j starts with equal affinity xj0 (j=1,2): this condition corresponds to Case 1, as described in 
Section 5.2.  The entire region (x10, x20)[0,1]
2 was sampled, and the system parameters used are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Parameters in simulations for Case 1 (unanimous starting affinities for each group) 
Symbol Significance Value 
b1 Negative drift from within-group interactions 0.002 
b2 Positive drift from intergroup interactions 3b1   
c Cohesion parameter 0.25b1 (small c case)  
4b1 (large c case) 
N Number of agents in each group 250 
– Number of iterations 500N 
 Noise parameter in individual interactions 2b1 (piecewise-linear model)  
b1 (nonlinear model) 
h(x) Influence function sign(x) (piecewise-linear model) 
x (nonlinear  model) 
6.1.1 Simulation for piecewise-linear model, h(x) = sign(x) 
Simulation results for the case h(x) = sign(x) (which gives rise to a piecewise-linear model, as described in 
Section 5)  are shown in Figure 1. The two lines x1= x2 and x1+x2=1 divide the square [0,1]
2 into quadrants, and 
the system exhibits symmetry about the x1=x2 line. (For general values b1 and b2, the dividing lines are 
x1+x2=4b1/(b1+b2)  and x1=x2, and symmetry about x1=x2 is preserved.)  Red asterisks indicate the different 
starting points used for different simulation scenarios:  the  x1 (resp. x2) coordinate corresponds to the starting 
affinity value for all members of Group 1 (resp. Group 2). Black lines show the subsequent trajectories predicted 
by the “sticky model” equations derived in Section 5.2.1.1. Blue and green dotted lines show respectively the 
trajectories followed by the (10th,10th) and  (90th,90th) percentiles of affinities for (Group 1, Group 2) in the 
agent-based simulations. The red dotted line similarly shows the trajectory followed by the median values. 
Figure 1(left) corresponds to a small cohesion parameter (c=0.25b1), while Figure 1(right) uses a large cohesion 
(c=4b1), where b1 is the within-group interaction drift. 
In both the small-c and the large-c case, the sticky model trajectories derived in Section 5.2.1.1  predict quite 
closely the trajectories of the agent-based model medians. In the large c case the 10th and 90th  percentile 
trajectories remain close to the median trajectories, showing that  the spreading of the distribution is limited 
which in turn implies that the sticky assumption is not unrealistic.  In the small c case the tracking is somewhat 
looser, especially in cases where the two groups’ initial affinities are substantially different. The small c figure 
shows one case with starting affinities (x1, x2)  on the x1+x2=1 line, in which the 10
th  and 90th  percentiles tend 
towards (0,0) and (1,1), respectively. In this case, both populations are dividing into extremist and moderate 
factions. This situation is further explored in subsequent simulations. 
In most cases the system tends either towards (0,0) or (1,1) (corresponding to all extremists and all moderates, 
respectively). When c is small, in scenarios where the two populations beginning in the extreme upper left or 
lower right corners, one group may end up all nearly extremist (affinity0), while the other group ends up all 
nearly moderate (affinity1).  When c is large, in all cases the system move fairly directly towards the x1=x2 line, 
and the affinities in each group spread only slightly. Once the x1=x2 line is met, the system moves either towards 
(0,0)  or (1,1): if the agent-based system meets the border of the square, it continues  along the border until it 
reaches one of these corners.   Since the size of the cohesion parameter c reflects the degree to which interacting 
individuals influence each other,  it stands to reason that when c is large, the two groups should end up with the 
same overall affinity. 
 Figure 1 Comparison of  piecewise-linear “sticky model” predictions (with influence function h(x)=sign(x)) with 
agent-based simulations in which each group initially has unanimous affinities. Red asterisks show starting 
conditions; black trajectories show sticky-model theoretical predictions; and blue, red, and green dotted lines show 
the trajectories of 10th percentiles, medians, and 90th percentiles  as explained in the text. Figure (a) uses a value of 
the cohesion parameter c that is 1/4 times the intergroup drift b1, while the figure (b) uses c=4b1. 
6.1.2 Simulation of nonlinear model, h(x) = x 
System trajectories for a linear influence function h(x)=x (which gives rise to a nonlinear model), are shown in 
Figure 2.  Most of the characteristics of the piecewise-linear model described above also apply to the nonlinear 
model. Once again, the agent-based model medians follow quite closely the theoretical sticky-model trajectories 
(derived in Section 5.2.1.2).  The spreading of affinity distributions (evidenced by the divergence of blue and 
green dotted trajectories) is somewhat greater than in the piecewise-linear case (the noise factor  was reduced 
by half to reduce the spreading and make trajectories clearer.)   
 
Figure 2 Comparison of  nonlinear “sticky model” predictions (with influence function h(x) = x) with agent-based 
simulations in which each group initially has a single characteristic affinity.  Trajectories have the same 
interpretation as in Figure 1. 
 
We conclude from both piecewise-linear and nonlinear model simulations that the “sticky model” is quite 
accurate in cases where all individuals in each group begins with the same opinion of the other group.  It is 
especially accurate if the cohesion parameter c is relatively large. Apparently these results are not particularly 
sensitive to the form of the influence function h. Except for extreme cases, the eventual fate of the system 
depends entirely on the  position of initial (x1,x2) compared with the line x1+ x2 = 4b1(b1+ b2)
-1.  If the initial 
position lies below (resp. above) the line, then all individuals become extremists (resp. moderates). Only if the 
initial position lies exactly on this line is it possible for groups to split into extremist and moderate factions. The 
tendency to split is enhanced when the cohesion c is smaller. 
These results seem to indicate that early intervention is absolutely critical in the case of divided communities 
with the potential of developing antagonistic relations.  Intervention should attempt to reduce negative drifts 
produced by within-group interactions, as well as encourage positive interactions between groups. There appears 
to be a minimum level of effective intervention, below which the situation will progressively deteriorate and 
above which the situation will eventually achieve universal moderation. 
6.2 Sports program simulations 
We may simulate sports programs such as described in Section 3 by modifying the model to include occasional 
“sporting events” which involve a select group of agents, half from each group.  Sporting events occur randomly 
at a given frequency, and each sporting effect improves the affinity of  all participants by a determined amount 
b2+.  Parameters for the simulations are shown in Table 2. Figure 3  shows the equilibrium proportion of 
moderates (color scale) as a function of the initial affinity (all individuals in both groups begin with the same 
affinity) and fraction of sports program participants from each group.   
Table 2 Parameters for sports program simulations 
Symbol Significance Value 
b1 Negative drift for within-group interactions 0.003 
b2 Positive drift for between-group interactions 0.007 
c Cohesion parameter b1/3 (small c); 3b1 (large c) 
b2+ Increase in affinity for sports participants 0.003 
– Frequency of sports programs 0.01 
– Fraction of each group that participate 0.05–0.95 
– Starting affinity (unanimous) 0.05–0.95 
N Number of agents in each group 250 
– Number of iterations 2000N 
 Noise parameter in individual interactions 0 
h(x) Influence function x (nonlinear model) 
 
Figure 3  (left)  shows the situation when cohesion between individuals in the society is small (c=b1/3). In this 
case, when the initial unanimous affinity falls below a certain threshold the effectiveness of sports programs is 
limited to program participants only. For example, when the participation rate is 0.1 then the threshold is roughly 
0.65: this means that if the initial unanimous affinity is less than 0.65, then only program participants become 
moderates and the remainder of the population is relatively unaffected (in the figures, “moderate” is defined as 
possessing an affinity above 0.9).  On the other hand, if the initial unanimous affinity is above the threshold, the 
influence of the program is propagated throughout both groups, and virtually 100% of both groups attain 
moderate affinities. The threshold decreases gradually as the proportion of participants increases. 
Figure 3  (right)  shows the situation when cohesion between individuals in the society is large (c=3b1). In this 
case, the effectiveness of sports programs is greatly enhanced compared to the small-c case. For low rates of 
participation, thresholds still exist below which only participants become moderate in equilibrium: but these 
thresholds are lowered compared to the small-c case, and only exist when the rate of participation is under about 
20 percent. In all other cases, moderation pervades the entire population.   
These results point to the effectiveness of sports programs (or similar programs designed to produce positive 
interactions between subgroups) when the relational situation has not degenerated too seriously.  The 
effectiveness of such programs is greatly reduced when cohesion within the population is reduced. 
 
 
Figure 3 Equilibrium proportions of moderates (affinity > 0.9)  for communities with simulated sports programs for  
c= b1/3 (left) and  c=3b1 (right).  The equilibrium affinity for each (fraction of participants, initial affinity) 
combination is indicated by the color scale running from 0 (deep blue) to 1 (dark red). 
 
6.3 Polarized starting conditions (Case 2) 
Simulations were performed to verify the theoretical predictions made in Section 5 for the case where both 
groups are initially divided between extremist (affinity=0) and moderate (affinity=1) fractions (which we 
designated as Case 2).  Parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table 3.   
Table 3 Parameters for polarized-group simulations (Case 2) 
Symbol Significance Value 
b1 Negative drift for within-group interactions 0.003 
b2 Positive drift for between-group interactions 0.007 
c Cohesion parameter 0.001 
f1 Starting fraction of moderates (Group 1) 0< f1<1 
f2 Starting fraction of moderates (Group 2) 0< f2<1 
N Number of agents in each group 250 
– Number of iterations 4000N 
 Noise parameter in individual interactions 0 
h(x) Influence function x (nonlinear model) 
Figure 4 shows the theoretical region of stable (f1, f2) configurations  for the given set of parameters, where fj 
represents the starting proportion of moderates in group j, j=1,2.  
 
 
Figure 4 Theoretical region of polarized stability, as a function of initial moderate percentages. (The figure was 
generated using the open-source software Geogebra.) 
Simulation results are depicted in Figure 5 (left) and (right), which show the equilibrium proportion of 
moderates (affinity > 0.9) in Groups 1 and 2 respectively, as a function of different (f1, f2) starting configurations.  
The dark blue regions correspond to initial (f1, f2) configurations that eventually lead to all extremists; while the 
dark red regions correspond to initial configurations that eventually lead to all moderates. The in-between 
rainbow-colored region, which resembles the theoretical region in Figure 4, give stable (f1, f2) pairs. The vertical 
color stripes in the figure at left show that the equilibrium  moderate fraction for Group 1 is nearly independent 
of the starting f2 value; and the horizontal stripes in the figure at left indicate that the same statement is true with 
12. This confirms that the region of  (f1, f2) stability for the agent-based model conforms closely to the 
theoretical prediction. Note the region is actually somewhat smaller than theory would suggest, reflecting the 
fact that the agent-based dynamics produces fluctuations that undermine the stability of the system. 
 
 
Figure 5 Equilibrium moderate fractions for Group 1 (left) and Group 2 (right) as a function of starting (Group 1, 
Group 2) moderate fractions in Case 2.   The equilibrium moderate fractions are indicated by the color scales at 
right.   
6.4 Uniform starting distributions (Case 3) 
We also simulated the case where both groups start from uniform distributions, using the parameters in Table 4. 
The ratios b2/b1 and c/b1 may be considered as the independent parameters which determine the eventual 
behavior of the system. (Changing the value of b1 while holding the ratios b2/b1 and c/b1 will only change the 
effective time scale over which changes occur, but will not affect the eventual equilibrium values.) 
Table 4 Parameters for simulations starting from uniform distribution 
Symbol Significance Value 
b1 Negative drift for within-group interactions 0.01 
b2 Positive drift for between-group interactions 0.18b1 ≤ b2 ≤ 5.6b1 
c Cohesion parameter 0.18b1 ≤ c ≤ 5.6b1 
N Number of agents in each group 250 
– Number of iterations 2000N, 200N 
 Noise parameter in individual interactions 0.01 
h(x) Influence function x (nonlinear model) 
 
Figure 6 shows the equilibrium  10th percentile, median, and 90th  percentiles (center, left, and right respectively) 
using a color scale, as a function of the parameters c/b1 and b2/b1.  The three graphs are virtually identical, which 
means that all individuals eventually arrive at the same affinity.  The graphs also show the final value is 
independent of c. Furthermore, there is a cutoff value of b2/b1 below which unanimous extremism is attained, and 
above with unanimous moderation is the result.  The cutoff corresponds to log10(b2/b1)  0.47, or b2  3b1: as we 
have seen in Section 5.2, this corresponds to the situation shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, where the line 
x1+x2=1 is a critical line which divides starting conditions that go to unanimous extremism from those that go to 
unanimous moderation. In particular, if x1=x2=x  is the unanimous starting affinity, then x=1/2 is the critical value 
below which the system ends up in unanimous extremism, and above which all become moderates. It follows 
that if b2 < 3b1, then a system that starts unanimously with x1=x2=1/2 will end up in extremism; while if b2 > 3b1, 
then the same starting conditions will lead to unanimous moderation. In other words, the eventual fate of the 
system with uniform starting distribution of affinities is the same as  a system where all individuals begin with 
affinity 1/2, which is both median and mean of the uniform distribution.   
 
 
Figure 6 Equilibrium 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile affinities for system starting from uniform 
distribution, as a function of system parameter ratios c/b1 and b2/b1. System parameters are given in Table 4. Affinity 
values are according to the color scale at right. 
Figure 7 gives information about the speed of convergence of the system with uniform starting distribution. 
System parameters are the same as in Figure 6, but the simulation is run for fewer iterations. The results show 
that 10th percentile values converge less rapidly when log10(b2/b1)0.47 and log10c/b1<0. In Section 5.4 we saw 
that the sign of  K1 = 4c – b1  – b2  determined the convergence/divergence behavior of the theoretical continuous 
solution. In the current simulation, K1=0 corresponds to c=0.875b1, or log10c/b1= 0.06. It follows that a change 
in the sign of K1 does indeed correspond to a discontinuous change in the convergence behavior, as might be 
expected from the theoretical discussion. We will explore this connection further in the next section. 
 
Figure 7 Equilibrium median affinities for systems starting from uniform distribution. All system parameters are  as 
in Figure 1, but the number of iterations is reduced to 200N. Median and 90th percentiles have converged in this time 
frame, but 10th percentiles are slower to converge for systems with log10 c/b1 < 0.06 and log10(b2/b1)  0.47. 
 
6.5 Spreading dynamics of distribution as a function of cohesion. 
In Section 5.4 we inferred the possible existence of fixed-point solutions for the affinity distributions in which all 
affinities are identical, for certain parameter values. In this section we  numerically investigate the behavior 
when the system is started at one of these potential fixed points. Table 5 shows parameters for these simulations: 
the values of x1 x2 were fixed at 2b1 / (b1 + b2) in accordance with the potential fixed point values computed in 
Section 5.4. 
Table 5 Parameters for simulations starting from uniform distribution 
Symbol Significance Value 
b1 Negative drift for within-group interactions 0.01 
b2 Positive drift for between-group interactions 2.5b1 
c Cohesion parameter b1/3 and b1 
N Number of agents in each group 250 
– Number of iterations 1000N 
 Noise parameter in individual interactions 0.0 
h(x) Influence function x (nonlinear model) 
x1,x2 Unanimous starting affinity 2b1 / (b1 + b2) 
 
Figure 8 shows results of two typical simulations when the cohesion is small (c=b1/3).  For each iteration number 
(x-axis scale),  the affinities (y-axis scale) of  individuals in Groups 1 and 2 are plotted as green and red dots 
respectively. Simulations invariably end up either all extremist or all moderate, and the result varies from 
simulation to simulation. The distributions bifurcate temporarily into extremist and moderate factions, with 
relatively few individuals having intermediate affinities. This bifurcated state lasts between 200-400 iterations, 
after which all affinities either migrate upwards or downwards. 
 Figure 8 Example distribution evolutions for system starting from theoretical fixed point, small-cohesion case (c = 
b1/3). Group 1 and Group 2 individuals are represented by green and red dots, respectively. 
Figure 9 shows example system histories for a larger values of c (c=b1). Once again, affinities eventually become 
unanimously extremist or unanimously moderate, depending on the particular simulation. In this case however, 
there is no bifurcation. This result is consistent with the theoretical result derived in Section 6.5 that distribution 
spreading should be expected when 4c – b1  – b2 <0, while distributions should tend to stick together when  4c – 
b1  – b2 >0.  
 
Figure 9 Equilibrium distribution starting from theoretical fixed point, medium-cohesion case (c=b1) 
These conclusions are confirmed in Figure 10, which represents the dispersive behavior starting from the 
theoretical fixed point as a function of c. Each vertical blue segment corresponds to a single simulation: lower 
and upper endpoints of the segment correspond to the final 10th and 90th affinity percentiles, respectively, while 
the dot within the segment denotes the final median affinity. Each segment is located above the corresponding 
simulation’s value of log10(c/b1), shown on the x axis.  System parameters are as in Table 5, except that c/b1 is 
allowed to vary as shown on the x-axis scale. Figure 10 (left) shows simulation results after 250N iterations, 
while the Figure 10 (right) shows results after 1000N iterations. The green line in each figure shows a local 
Gaussian-smoothed average of the median affinities for simulations with nearby values of c/b1. 
The figures shows that lower values of c are associated with increased spreading, slower convergence, and a 
greater tendency to end up in extremism. There is a fairly rapid changeover in behavior in the interval -
0.2<log10(c/b1) <0, which is close to theoretical changeover point log10(c/b1)0.06 corresponding to the 
condition 4c – b1  – b2 >0. When c becomes larger, the percentages of simulations that end up extremist/moderate 
tend towards 50/50 (as shown by the green line). 
 
 Figure 10 Final 10th percentiles, medians, and 90th percentiles for affinities for multiple simulations starting from 
theoretical fixed point, for a range of values of c/b1.  
7 Discussion and conclusions 
The theoretical and simulation results presented above have potentially important implications for policy 
decisions for dealing with divided communities with the potential for intergroup violence. 
Both theory and simulations point out the unstable nature of the system. Social pressures produce polarization, 
and individuals either tend increasingly towards moderation or extremism. The middle ground eventually 
vanishes.   
To achieve a moderate society, a much stronger positive tendency due to intergroup interactions is required to 
overcome the negative tendency associated with within-group interactions.  In practice, positive drift may result 
from mutual educational, economic, cultural and/or social advantages derived from intergroup interactions.  Any 
positive gains in affinity can be erased by negative between-group interactions (such as exploitation or 
hooliganism) that reduce or negate the between-group drift parameter b2. 
The model indicates that rapid intervention is required to reverse negative trends, because such reversals rapidly 
become increasingly more difficult. There exists a threshold level of intervention, below which the intervention 
is ineffective and may be counterproductive, and above which the desired goal of moderation will eventually be 
achieved. 
Simulations indicate the effectiveness of sports programs when relationships between groups have not seriously 
degenerated. But if antipathy is already strong, sports programs may actually worsen the situation by singling out 
participants and creating distance between them and others in their own community.  Effectiveness of sports 
programs are seriously undermined if social cohesion is weak. 
It is possible for a divided population to have stable moderate and extremist factions in each group. However, 
some of these cases are marginally stable, and a very slight change in overall affinity can push the system over 
the edge to become all moderate or all extremist, depending on the original configuration of factions. 
For continuous affinity distributions, even if the distribution is quite disperse (as in the case of a uniform 
distribution) the tendency is for the system to end up either with unanimous moderation or unanimous 
extremism. The major determinants of the system’s eventual fate appears to be the sum of median affinities of 
the two groups, and the drifts associated with within-group and intergroup interactions. 
The degree of cohesion present in the society has significant influence on the dynamics. There is not a sharp 
critical level of cohesion where the behavior suddenly changes, but there is a fairly narrow changeover interval: 
the location of this interval on the negative within-group interaction drift and the positive between-group 
interaction drift. Communities in which cohesion is weakened are vulnerable to polarization, and are more 
difficult to reach through community outreaches that target only a portion of the population. Our study suggests 
that increased extremism in recent years may be  related to reduced interpersonal cohesion within groups 
resulting from modernization.   
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